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Abstract
An improved method for measuring and testing long-run returns is proposed. The method adjusts
for the right-skewed distribution of long-run buy-and-hold by decomposing average cross-
sectional buy-and-hold returns into mean components and volatility components. The method is
applied to initial public offerings in Denmark. The mean-component under performance of initial
public offering stocks compared to the market is 30 percent and significant after five years.
Compared to matching firms the under performance of IPO stocks is 13 percent after five years
but insignificant.
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testing; volatility filtering.
JEL classification: G14, G32
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21. Introduction
Recently, attention has been directed to the methodological issues of measuring and testing long-
run returns, e.g. Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Lyon,
Barber and Tsai (1999). Fama (1998) argues that the anomalies like over or under performance
in studies of, e.g. initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings are due to methodological
problems and especially in the long run where the problem with the right-skewed distribution of
long-run returns arises. Fama (1998), however, does not propose a method that can solve the
problem with the right skewed distribution of long-run returns. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999)
suggest a skewness-adjusted t-test statistic for testing long-run abnormal returns. The skewness
adjustment origins from the third order moment adjustment of the asymptotic normality test but
otherwise the distribution properties of long-run returns are not pursued any further. In the further
pursuit of measuring and testing long-run returns we propose a methodology that does consider
the distribution properties of long-run returns and according to the distribution properties
explicitly model the long- run returns.
This paper addresses the statistical problems of measuring and testing long-horizon returns.
We question the validity of prior tests of long-run returns, especially in the literature of initial
public offerings and seasoned equity offerings. We show that prior tests applying simple t-tests
cannot be assumed valid because of the right skewed distribution of the long-run returns. We
propose a new method for measuring and testing long-run returns. Our point of origin is that the
distribution properties of long-run returns have to be considered. The proposed method consists
of two steps. First, we investigate whether the long-run returns are log-normally distributed. If the
long-run returns of the data series are rejected as being log-normally distributed we look for
3transformations of the data series that will have long-run returns that can be accepted as being
log-normally distributed. Secondly, when we have data transformations that are accepted as
being log-normally distributed, we decompose each of the average cross-sectional long-run
returns at the different time horizons into two components: a mean component and a volatility
component. Each of those components can be tested for significance against alternatives and the
marginal dynamics of the cross-sectional long-run returns, for the different time horizons, can be
represented by geometric Brownian motions. The proposed method can be applied to any
analysis of long-run returns. We apply the method to initial public offerings in Denmark in the
period 1984-1992 allowing us to follow the long-run returns for up to five years after the
offerings. We find that if data are transformed to wealth relatives the long-run returns of the
wealth relatives can be accepted as being log-normally distributed.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly describes, for our study, relevant findings
of the initial public offerings literature. Section 3 describes the data of the study. Section 4
discusses the calculation of returns compatible with log-normality of cross-sectional buy-and-
hold returns. Section 5 presents the proposed method and the decomposition, and section 6
presents the tests of the components. Section 7 summarises and concludes.
2. Initial Public Offerings
Several studies have shown that investment in initial public offering stocks (IPO stocks) is a
money loosing strategy in the long run, however that result is in sharp contrast to a substantial
number of studies of the first-day returns (initial returns) that concurrently report that it is indeed a
very profitable strategy to invest in IPO stocks in the offering period.1,2  The relatively large
4positive short-term returns are taken as indicating that the offering prices of IPO stocks are
systematically set too low.3,4 Regarding the long run, no theory has been proposed that
satisfactorily can explain the long-run under performance of IPO stocks that is observed for up
to five years after the initial public offerings. Loughran and Ritter (1995) go as far as to describe
this pattern as being a  “puzzle”.
With Ritter’s path breaking paper, Ritter (1991), the start was given to several studies of the
long-run returns of IPO stocks on the international capital markets. Ritter (1991) and Loughran
and Ritter (1995) find for US data that IPO stocks on average under perform other stocks up to
five years after the initial public offerings. For the US, an average under performance of 29
percent is reported after the first three years and not less than 50 percent after five years. For
other capital markets Levis (1993) finds that English IPO stocks experience an average loss of
30 percent three years after their initial public offerings compared to the market. Corresponding
results have been found in Brazil and Chile (Aggarwal et al., 1993), Finland (Keloharjo, 1993),
Switzerland (Kunz and Aggarwal, 1994), Australia (Lee et al., 1996) and in South Africa (Page
and Reyneke, 1997).
Cross-sectional analyses of the stock returns by using broad economic and company specific
characteristics have contributed with some interesting empirical results. Shaw (1971) finds
indications that the under performance is the most widespread in periods with many initial public
offerings - the so-called ”hot-issue” periods. Loughran and Ritter (1995) confirm that under
performance is relatively modest in periods with few initial public offerings and prominent in
periods with many initial public offerings. Ritter (1991) finds that the under performance is more
pronounced among small capitalisation offers and that this under performance is concentrated
5among relatively younger growth firms that are being offered in periods with a high initial public
offering activity. That result is supported by Levis (1993) who also finds that the size of the issue
is an important factor for explaining the under performance of small offers. A recent study by
Brav and Gompers (1997) finds that the under performance is relatively modest among firms
with venture companies behind the initial public offerings while it is more pronounced among
firms without venture companies behind the offering.
3. The data
Our data set consists of Danish initial public offerings in the period 1984-1992 allowing us to
calculate up to five years buy-and-hold returns for the period 1984-1997. Within the period
1984-1992 a firm that went public on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange could choose between
an offering either of the fixed price system or of the tender system.5 For the fixed-price system
the new shares are offered to the public at a fixed price that is set in agreement between the IPO
firm and the issuing bank/consortium in charge of the initial public offering. All orders are settled
at the agreed price. In earlier times this method was widely used but the absolutely most
widespread method within the analysed offering period is the so-called tender system. The tender
system differs from the fixed price system by inviting the public to place binding orders at
different prices above a specified minimum price. When settling the offering price of the IPO
stock two conditions must be fulfilled in order to be allowed to float the stocks on the
Copenhagen Stock Exchange. (i) The face value of the issue must be sold at the highest possible
price and (ii) the spread of the stocks on different shareholders has to be sufficient. All orders
with higher order prices than the actual offering price of the stocks are settled at the actual
6offering price no matter what the price offer had been. The sufficiency-spread rule regarding the
allocation of the stocks on different shareholders is ambiguous and is assessed in each case by
the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The sample consists of 76 stocks within the population of
shipping, trading, service, and industry (non-financial) that were offered at the Copenhagen Stock
Exchange in the period January 1984 to December 1992. All the examined stocks were offered
via the tender system. In Table 1 below the annual distribution of initial public offerings for the
population is shown as well as the corresponding sample distribution of the 76 initial public
offerings. Information about the individual stock characteristics (last day of offering, the price at
the last day of offering, the issued amount, first day of trading, etc.) is gathered from Account
Data.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Table 1 shows that the number of and the value of the initial public offerings are not equally
distributed through the sampling period as 64 out of the 76 initial public offerings (84 percent)
took place within the period 1984-1986 with 90 percent of the total issued amount. The period
1984-1986 was a so-called hot-issue period characterised by high first-day returns and high
volumes. This hot-issue period may be due to two effects: an increased attention on stocks by
both firms and investors and the presence of a small capitalisation stock exchange. The increased
attention on Danish stock in the mid-1980’s was probably tricked by good business cycle
conditions and a so-called ‘real bond-yield tax’ on institutional investors that was effectuated in
1983 and implied that capital moved towards the stock market resulting in increasing stock
7prices and increasing equity financing. Secondly, in 1982 a so-called small-capitalisation stock
exchange was opened to promote stock financing of small size companies (2-15 mil. DKK). In
1989 the small-capitalisation stock exchange was closed. The distribution of the initial public
offerings on the small-capitalisation stock exchange was 14 in 1984, 2 in 1985, 14 in 1986, 1 in
1987, and 1 in 1988. However, the small-capitalisation initial public offerings can only partly
account for the large amounts of capital issued in the period 1984-1986.  For the whole sample
period 1984-1992 a total of 7 initial public offerings were excluded from the study either
because the offerings followed the fixed price system (6 cases) or lack of access to data (1
case). The sample of the 76 initial public offerings covers 91.6 percent of the total number of
initial public offerings within the period 1984-1992 and 89.3 percent of the total amount offered.
Besides data for individual stock characteristics we also include data for the market (we use
the Danish Total Stock Index of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange) and data for stocks of
matching firms. For each IPO stock we specifically choose a quoted stock of a matching firm of
approximately the same size by market value that has been quoted on the Copenhagen Stock
Exchange for at least five years.6  We observe those two reference data series with the same
frequency and dates as the IPO stocks. For instance, for the IPO stock: Ambu International Ltd.
the last day of offering (the closing date of the initial public offering) was on 27th February 1992.
We observe simultaneously the Danish Total Stock Index and the stock of the matching firm
from the same date, 27th February 1992, and with the same frequency. This procedure is used
for each of the 76 initial public offerings. The first-day return (initial return) of an IPO stock is
defined as the percentage change of the stock price from the last day of offering to the first day
of trading. The period between the last day of offering and the first day of trading is typically 8 to
810 days. The longest period observed in the sample is 19 days.7 Regarding the after-market
performance which covers the period from the first day of trading and onwards, the sampling
frequency of the returns is monthly and the observations are end of month observations.8
However, the first day of trading is usually not at the end of a month but e.g. in the middle of the
month. This timing problem is corrected for by calculating the return of the first month as the
return between the first day of trading and end of month of the subsequent month adjusted for the
number of days between the two dates.9
4. Calculating returns
We are interested in investigating how the stock returns of the IPO stocks have performed
compared to the market and the stocks of the matching firms for up five years after the initial
public offerings.10 For each stock, the long-run returns in the after market is calculated from the
first day of trading and to the month where the IPO stock was either de-listed or celebrated its
five years anniversary. If an IPO stock is de-listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange before
its five years anniversary the return is followed to the month of the de-listing. The relevant
measure of long-run returns is the so-called buy-and-hold return (BHR).11 If an amount Wi ,0  is
invested in a stock i with the stochastic monthly return ri t,  the amount after T months is Wi T, :
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Accordingly, the buy-and-hold return of the stock i after T months is:
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Figure 1A shows equally weighted average buy-and-hold returns for the IPO stocks, the market
(Danish Total Stock Index), and the stocks of the matching firms. Figure 1B shows the
corresponding standard deviations of the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns.
[Insert Figure 1A and Figure 1B around here]
Figure 1A shows that the cross-sectional average buy-and-hold returns of the IPO stocks all are
below the cross-sectional average buy-and-hold returns of the stocks of the matching firms.
After 30 months the average buy-and-hold return of the IPO stocks starts to increase while the
corresponding returns of the stocks of the matching firms do not. This indicates a diverging trend
in the growth rates. Compared to the market (Danish Total Stock Index) the average buy-and-
hold returns of the IPO stocks are above the average buy-and-hold returns of the market for the
first 30 months but thereafter below. The average buy-and-hold returns of the IPO stocks
increase after 30 months and increase with an average growth rate near the growth rate of the
average buy-and-hold returns of the market, which indicates a converging trend in the growth
rates. Figure 1B shows that the cross-sectional standard deviations of the Danish Total Stock
Index starts at 6 percent and increases softly to 25-30 percent and stabilises at that level. The
cross-sectional standard deviations of the IPO stocks and the stocks of the matching firms follow
each other closely. They start at 7-10 percent and rise steeply the first 18-24 months to a level of
85-105 percent and stabilise at that level. Table 2 shows that the average cross-sectional buy-
10
and-hold return 60 months after the initial public offerings is 43.2 percent for the IPO stocks,
69.8 percent for the market, and 55.5 percent for the stocks of the matching firms. (Table 2 also
report cumulative abnormal returns though that measure is in general a misleading measure of
long-run returns because the method of cumulative abnormal return does not account for the
compounding effect that is inherent in buy-and-hold returns.)
[Insert Table 2 around here]
The performance differences between the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of the
IPO stocks and the market, and the stocks of the matching firms, are not as large as is the case
of most other studies. After 3 years the IPO stocks under perform on average by 10 percent
compared to the market ([1.129/1.263]-1) and after 5 years the IPO stocks under perform on
average by roughly 16 percent compared to the market. That is a much smaller under
performance than is the case for Great Britain and US (see above). Considering the cumulative
abnormal returns in table 2 it is seen that there are differences to the buy-and-hold returns. The
differences are due to the fact that cumulative abnormal returns do not account for the
compounding effect as the buy-and-hold returns do. The differences between the buy-and-hold
returns and the cumulative abnormal returns show that the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns
are not symmetrically distributed. Moreover, the p-values in brackets in table 2 reject all of the
cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns as being normally distributed; though with the exception of
the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of the market after five years which is accepted as
being normally distributed on a 15-percent critical level of significance.12
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Caution regarding inference has to be taken on the background of the average cross-sectional
buy-and-hold returns if nothing is known about the distribution of the buy-and-hold returns. If the
buy-and-hold returns are not symmetrically distributed around the averages as table 2 indicates,
the standard deviations are insufficient statistics to describe the distribution of the buy-and-hold
returns. It is necessary to determine how skewed the distributions of the cross-sectional buy-
and-hold returns are. All in all, it is necessary to have a statistical starting point with distribution
regularities in order to perform an analysis of the buy-and-hold returns.
5. Method and model
Our point of origin is that the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns should be log-normally
distributed at any time horizon. If that is the case we can decompose average cross-sectional
buy-and-hold returns and model the marginal dynamics of long-run returns by the geometric
Brownian motion model.
Log-normality and wealth relatives
In figure 2 the log-normality of cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns is tested. In particular,
logarithms of the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns are tested for normality on a five-percent
critical level of significance using the normality test of Doornik and Hansen (1994) that adjust for
the sample size. Figure 2 shows that the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of the market
index are strongly rejected as being log-normally distributed. Also, the cross-sectional buy-and-
hold returns of the IPO stocks are rejected as being log-normally distributed. However, the
12
stocks of the matching firms are after the initial nine months after the initial public offering
accepted as being log-normally distributed.13
[Insert figure 2 around here]
As the cross-sectional long-run returns of the data series, with the exception of the stocks of the
matching firms, are rejected as being log-normally distributed we look for combinations or
transformations of the three data series such that the transformed data series can be accepted as
being log-normally distributed. We find that wealth-relative transformations can be accepted as
being log-normally distributed, and they are:
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for i = { ,..., }1 76  and T = { ,.. ., }1 60 . Wealth-relative transformations have been used before in
the literature, e.g. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995).14,15 The T2-transformations are
just the reverse relationships of the T1-transformations. Figure 3 shows the test statistics for the
logarithm of the wealth-relative transformations.16
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[Insert figure 3 around here]
For the IPO stocks versus the market index it is seen in Figure 3A that here are problems with
log-normality for up to 8 months after the first day of trading and again a bit after 4 years. For the
IPO stocks versus the stocks of the matching firms the same qualitative picture applies in the
beginning of the period.17
Consider the wealth relative MarketT
IPO
T WW at the end of month T, where tIPOr ,  and tMarketr ,
are stochastic returns at the end of month t.
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Taking the logarithm of the wealth relative gives:
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Going back to levels, the expression is:
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Given that the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relative is log-normally
distributed at different time horizons T, the logarithms of the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns
of the wealth relative at different time horizons are normally distributed:
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The subscript “T” on the mean parameter TMarket
IPO ,m  and the volatility parameter TMarket
IPO ,s
captures the feature that the parameters are allowed to vary over time. There are sixty different
mean parameters and sixty different volatility parameters going from a one-month time horizon up
to a sixty-month time horizon. The purpose of this flexibility of the mean and the volatility
parameters is that it allows for marginal determination and tests of the average cross-sectional
buy-and-hold returns for the different time horizons. For a given time horizon T, the cross-
sectional buy-and-hold returns at that particular time horizon is considered only, and independent
on other time horizons.
If a wealth relative is log-normally distributed an explicit structure can be invoked by the
geometric Brownian motion model that gives the wealth relative a dynamic representation.
Usually, a geometric Brownian motion has a constant drift parameter, e.g. m , and a constant
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volatility parameter, e.g. s . Here, however, with time varying parameters the geometric
Brownian motion only gives an expression for the marginal dynamics of the wealth relative and is
given by:
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where TMarket
IPO ,m  and TMarket
IPO ,s , are the constants described above, and tdZ  is a Wiener
process with ),0(~ dtNdZ t .  This formulation of the wealth relative implies that wealth relative
at a time horizon T is log-normally distributed and, thus, the natural logarithm of the wealth
relative at the time horizon T is normally distributed. The expected change of the logarithmic
wealth relative over the time interval dt measured from time T is given by dt
T
Market
IPO ,
m  and the
unexpected change over the same time interval is given by tdZT
Market
IPO ,
s . As the wealth relative is
log-normally distributed the expected value and the variance of the wealth relative at time T is
given by, respectively:
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From expression (8) and for a given time horizon T, it is seen that the expected value of the
wealth relative depends on both the mean parameter and the volatility parameter. If the volatility
parameter is zero meaning there is no noise, the wealth relative is purely described by the drift
parameter TMarket
IPO ,m  in the exponential function in expression (8). If noise is present the volatility
parameters will be positive and increase the expected value of the wealth relative. For the
expected value of the inverse wealth relative, i.e. the market measured against the IPO stocks,
the drift parameter is given by TMarket
IPO ,m-  but the volatility parameter will remain unchanged. The
volatility is identical irrespectively of how the wealth relative is measured, i.e. IPO stocks against
the market or the market against the IPO stocks. The volatility captures the variation between the
two wealth variables. We cannot test directly on the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold
returns in levels as the expected buy-and-hold returns in expression (8) are not exactly log-
normally distributed. However, we can estimate and test the parameters, which is done in section
6.
Table 3 shows the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns for different buy-and-hold
horizons according to the left-hand-side of equation (8) and corresponding standard deviations
according to the square root of expression (9).
[Insert Table 3 around here]
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Table 3 shows that the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relative
between the market and the IPO stocks are positive and very large compared to the averages in
figure 1 and table 2, above. Five years after the first day of trading the average buy-and-hold
return of the equal weighted wealth relative between the market and the IPO stocks is 84.6
percent.18  For the stocks of the matching firms relative to the IPO stocks the average buy-and-
hold return of the wealth relative after five years is also quite large at 62.6 percent. For both but
the wealth relatives the standard deviations are very large, too. For the other transformations, i.e.
T1-transformations, table 3 shows that the average buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relative
between the IPO stocks and the market, or the wealth relative between the IPO stocks and the
stocks of the matching firms, are not very large compared to the T2-transformations. From the
first day of trading and five years hence the average under performance of the IPO stocks
relative to the market is not more than 10.6 percent and relative to the stocks of the matching
firms the IPO stocks actually out perform by 22.7 percent. Again, the standard deviations of the
buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relatives are quite large.
Decomposing average buy-and-hold returns
It may seem contra intuitive that the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of the wealth
relatives vary so much depending on whether the T1- or the T2-transformations are used. The
reason is the volatility parameter in expression (8) is identical whatever way a wealth relative is
measured, e.g. IPO versus Market or Market versus IPO (equivalently for IPO versus matching
firms and matching firms versus IPO). For instance, for the stocks of the matching firms relative
to the IPO stocks, it is seen in table 3 that the average cross-sectional out performance after five
18
years is 62.5 percent. However, for the inverse measure (IPO stocks measured relative to the
stocks of the matching firms) an out performance also observed and it is 22.7 percent after five
years. This seems inconsistent but it turns out that there is nothing peculiar in it when expression
(8) is decomposed. Consider the following decomposition of the expected wealth relative in
expression (8).
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When the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns have been volatility adjusted, i.e. the
volatility component in expression (10) has been taken out, the mean-component under
performance of the IPO stocks relative to the stocks of the matching firms is 13.1 percent
(volatility is positive 41.3 percent). Correspondingly, the volatility-adjusted out performance of
the stocks of the matching firms relative to the IPO stocks is 15.1 percent (volatility is positive
41.3 percent). The large volatility has a positive influence on the average cross-sectional buy-
and-hold return that, in the case where the IPO stocks are measured against the stocks of the
matching firms, results in a large dominance by the volatility component. The under performance
measured by the mean component (-13.1 percent) is out weighted by the large volatility (43.1
percent) which gives a misleading result of 22.7 percent (i.e. 0.227=(1-0.131)(1+0.413)-1) out
performance that seems inconsistent. The volatility component captures the variation between the
wealth of the two variables that enters the wealth-relative measure. As the volatility component is
a common factor for a wealth relative and for its inverse transformation it is necessary to adjust
19
for the volatility component. Otherwise the interpretation of the performance of a wealth relative
does not make sense. It should be noted that we consider a wealth relative as a single variable
that can be measured in two ways according to the transformations T1 and T2, and it is on that
variable that we make our interpretation. We do not form any interpretation on each of the
variables that the wealth variable consists of, as we cannot do that according to our tests of log-
normality. We are only making inference from the wealth-relative measure using the
decomposition in expression (10).
In figure 4 and figure 5 below the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of expression (8)
are shown on the left-hand side of the charts and the decomposition into the mean components
and the volatility components in expression (10) are shown on the right-hand side. We have
chosen to show figures thereby enabling the reader to see all the time horizons. However in table
4 a few numbers are shown. In the figures the mean component is normalised to zero and is given
by 1, -×TTJe m , and the volatility component is also normalised to zero and is given by
1
2
,2
1
-
×TTJe
s
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[Insert Figure 4 around here]
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
[Insert Table 4 around here]
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The volatility component has a positive common effect on an average buy-and-hold return
independent on which of the transformations T1 or T2 that is considered. Independent of the
transformation T1 or T2 the volatility component is exactly the same for a given wealth relative
and a given time horizon. That is an implication of the log-normal distribution of a wealth relative
and is seen in figure 4 (panel B and panel D) and in figure 5 (panel B and panel D). The volatility
contributes positively to the level average value of a wealth relative, and the more the longer the
time horizon is. If the mean component of the logarithmic transformation is zero and there is noise
present under the logarithmic transformation the level average cross-sectional buy-and-hold
returns will be positive and increase with the time horizon. The intuition is that even if the mean
component of the logarithmic transformation is zero the positive gains will accumulate more than
the losses. That gives a right skewed distribution that is observed in the cross-sectional buy-and-
hold returns. Noise is in this sense beneficial for long-term investors.
However, the effect of the mean component depends on the transformation. The effect of the
normalised mean component on the average buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relatives is
positive when the ratio is measured as the market or the stocks of the matching firms relative to
the IPO stocks (figure 4 - panel B and figure 5 - panel B). The normalised mean component is
correspondingly negative when the IPO stocks are measure relative to the market or relative to
the stocks of the matching firms (figure 4 - panel D and Figure 5 - Panel D). Depending on
whether the normalised mean component is positive or negative the two components (the mean
component and the volatility component) either amplify each other or dampen each other. For
instance, after 5 years the mean-component under performance of the IPO stocks relative to the
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market is 30.4 percent (figure 4 - panel D) and the mean-component under performance of the
IPO stocks relative to the stocks of the matching firms is 13.1 percent (figure 5 – panel D).
6. Testing
The above analysis shows average buy-and-hold returns and the decomposition into mean
components and volatility components. However, we do not a priori know whether a result of
under performance or out performance is significant or not by just observing the mean
components. We need to test it. In expression (6) it is shown that the logarithms of the cross-
sectional buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relatives are normally distributed. Normalising the
initial wealth relative to one, the estimated mean and the estimated standard deviation of
)log( ,TJW  are given by TTJ ×,
~m  and TTJ ×,
~s , respectively and the marginal parameter
estimates are given by:
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We can test the marginal estimates TTJ ×,
~m  and TTJ ×,
~s  using ordinary test statistics. The
tests are marginal tests meaning that we only consider the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns at
a given time horizon T independent on other time periods. The test of the marginal estimate of the
mean at time T against an alternative is t-distributed with 75 degrees of freedom (e.g. Aitchison
and Brown, 1969). An obvious hypothesis to test is that the marginal estimate at time T is zero
against the alternative that it is not.
0~:
0~:
,
,0
¹×
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TH
TH
TJA
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Market
IPOJ =  and }60,...1{=T .
Rather than showing a few selected statistics we show the test graphically in figure 6 by showing
marginal estimates and the corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals. In figure 6, the
marginal estimates and the confidence intervals are transformed back to levels, i.e. 1,
~
-×TTJe m ,
to make them directly comparable with figure 4 and figure 5. On the left-hand side of figure 6 we
show the mean components and confidence intervals for the different wealth relatives. On the
right-hand side we show the volatility components and corresponding 95-percent confidence
intervals. (Marginal estimates of the volatility at time T, i.e. TTJ ×
2
,
~s , and the tests against
positive alternatives are 2c -distributed with 75 degrees of freedom.) The marginal estimates are
significant when the confidence intervals are away from the alternative.
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For the IPO stocks versus the market (or vice versa) the mean component is significant
different from zero after 26 months on a 95-percent level of significance. For the IPO stocks
versus the stocks of the matching firms (or vice versa) the mean component is significant different
from zero after 22 months on a 95-percent level of significance. However, after sixty months the
IPO stocks are not significantly different from the stocks of the matching firms. Thus, it takes
roughly two and a half years before the IPO stocks significantly differs from the benchmarks. The
most significant benchmark is the Market whereas the benchmark of the stocks of the matching
firms is not that significant. Table 5 compares the different methods.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Table 5 shows that the cross-sectional averages of the different methods vary. A problem with
the arithmetic average of method 1 is that it is not possible to test the level averages by ordinary
t-tests due to the right skewed distributions of the buy-and-hold returns.19 Moreover, a
difference between two average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns does not make sense as
the difference, at best, would be a difference between two log-normal distributions and that is
non-sense. For method 2 where the buy-and-hold returns of the wealth relatives are described
as log-normal distributions it is also a problem to test the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold
returns in levels because it is a joint test of the mean and volatility components; see equations (8).
Method 3 makes it possible to test the mean components and the volatility components,
separately. The procedure is the following. First, the wealth relatives are transformed to
logarithms, thereby making the logarithmic distributions symmetric. Subsequently, the means and
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the variances of those symmetric distributions can be tested against alternatives. For graphical
exposition and comparison to the cross-sectional level averages, the mean components and the
volatility components over the are transformed back to levels and normalised to zero. Thus,
method 3 decomposes the averages cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns into mean components
and volatility components. This procedure makes it possible to compare the T1- and the T2-
transformations and therefore form inference on the wealth-relative measure.
An illustrative example is to consider figure 4 after 30 months from the first day of trading.
Considering figure 4 – panel C and panel D, the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold return of
the wealth relative of IPO stocks versus the market is zero. However, the mean and the volatility
components are -17 percent and 20 percent, respectively, and significantly different from zero. If
the ratio had been turned around, i.e. figure 4 – panel A and panel B, the average over
performance of the market relative to the IPO stocks is 46 percent. That over performance
consists of a significant mean-component over performance of 20 percent and a significant
volatility-component over performance of 20 percent. Hence, considering an average cross-
sectional buy-and-hold return of a wealth relative does not by itself make any sense; it is either 0
percent or 46 percent. However, the decomposition does make sense. As the size of volatility
component is the same independently of the used transformation, it is natural to filter it out and
look at the mean component for making conclusions. Looking at the mean component the
conclusion is that compared to the market the IPO stocks under perform by 17 percent after
thirty months.
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After five years the mean-component under performance of the IPO stocks relative to the
market is 30.4 percent. This is equivalent to a mean-component over performance of the market
relative to the IPO stocks of 43.7 percent (see figure 4 - panel B and D). If the decomposition
had not been made the two numbers that could be compared would just be the cross-sectional
level averages: –10.6 percent and 84.6 percent, respectively, (see table 3); and those two
numbers are not easily compared. For a given time horizon, the volatility is, as stated above, the
same for both transformations and it is 28.4 percent after five years. By multiplying the gross
buy-and-hold returns of the mean component and the volatility component the average gross
buy-and-hold return in level prevails.20
7. Conclusions
The proposed procedure of this paper is to find data transformations that enable the cross-
sectional long-run returns to become log-normally distributed. Subsequently, the mean
components and the volatility components are estimated for different time horizons. From such
estimates it can be deduced how much of a given average cross-sectional buy-and-hold return
that is due to the mean component and how much that is due to the volatility component (noise).
We investigate the long-run performance of 76 stocks of Danish non-financial firms that were
offered by the tender system on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in the period January 1984 –
December 1992. We follow the stocks of those firms (IPO stocks) for up to five years after the
initial public offerings and compared them to a market index (Danish Total Stock Index) and
stocks of matching firms. We find that the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns are skewed to
the right, which invalidates the use of normal t-tests for testing average cross-sectional buy-and-
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hold returns. We apply the proposed method for testing long-run returns. The method uses a
decomposition that necessitates that the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns are log-normally
distributed. However, as the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of the individual data series
cannot just be assumed to be log-normally distributed it may be necessary to make
transformations of the data series. We find for the data of this study, that the transformation of
the data to wealth-relatives makes the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns acceptable as being
log-normally distributed. As the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of wealth relatives are
accepted as being log-normally distributed, the average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of
the wealth relatives can be decomposed into mean components and volatility components. The
(log-) mean components and the (log-) volatility components can be tested against alternatives by
simple tests like the t-test and c2-test.
In general, we find that the market (Danish Total Stock Index) performs better than the IPO
stocks. Also, the stocks of the matching firms perform better than the IPO stocks though not as
pronounced. As the applied transformation measure of our study is wealth relatives, it is
necessary to filter out the volatility to achieve a clear picture of the performance between data
series. The volatility adjusted under performance of the IPO stocks compared to the market is
30.4 percent after five years. The volatility adjusted under performance of the IPO stocks
compared to the stocks of the matching firms is 13.1 percent after five years. Our overall results
regarding the under performance of IPO stocks compared to the market and stocks of matching
firms are consistent with results of other studies that support the hypothesis that the long-run
pattern of returns is not sampling or country specific.
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Presently, there exists no convincing theory that can explain the observed long-run under
performance of IPO stocks.  Ibbotson (1975) calls this under performance a ‘mystery’ and
Loughran and Ritter (1995) calls it a ‘puzzle’. Arguments concerning over-reaction and over-
optimism among investors and analysts are presently the most promising to explain the long-term
under performance (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). The hypothesis of over-reaction and over-
optimism hinge on the argument that the market participants are short-sighted and contribute too
much weight to improvements in operating income up to the time of an initial public offering. The
market participants ignore the long-term trends of mean reversion of the profitability of the
operation incomes. As a consequence, the trading prices on the first days of trading show a high
degree of capitalisation of transitory profit improvements as if the improvements had been
permanent. As time passes and the market receives information by annual reports etc. of the
origins of the transitory profitability improvements a downward adjustment of the initial estimates
of the future profitability takes place causing declining stock prices. The problem is however to
provide a good and consistent theory.
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1 See e.g. Ritter (1991); Aggarwal et al. (1993); Keloharju (1993); Levis (1993); Kunz and Aggarwal (1994);
Loughran and Ritter (1995); Lee et al. (1996), and Page and Reyneke (1997).
2 The first-day return is the return from the last day of offering to the first day of trading.
3 For a Danish study see Christensen and Sørensen (1988).  For a survey over other studies see Loughran et
al. (1994).
4 These include Rock’s (1986) ”winners curse” hypothesis and Kunz and Aggarwal’s (1994) explanation of
emission banks and lag of experience among IPO firms.
5 The so-called book-building system did first become relevant in 1994.
6 The method is at the 31st. December for each of the years 1983-1991 to rank all shipping, trading, servicing,
and industry firms (non-financial) according to their market value. The firm with market value closest to and
larger than the IPO firm is chosen as the matching firm. In the case that a matching firm is de-listed before its
corresponding IPO firm a second or if necessary a third firm is merged to take the place of the de-listed firm.
For instance, if a firm is offered in December 1986 and the matching firm’s last observed stock price in
Account Data is July 1989 another matching firm (that was not offered within the last five years) is merged to
take over from August 1989.
7 We could have standardised the first-day returns to weekly returns in order to be capable of comparing the
first-day returns across different periods between the last day of offering and the first day of trading. The
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standardisation would be the following: weekly return = 1
/7
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, where Pi,0  is the offering
price, Pi,1  is the stock price at the first day of trading, and days is the number of calendar days between the
last day of offering and the first day of trading. It turns out that standardising to weekly returns does not
have any effect on qualitative results of this study. Therefore we just use the raw first-day returns.
8 Monthly returns inclusive dividends in the after market for any stock i is calculated as:
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 where Pi t,  is the stock price at time t and Di t,  is the dividend at time t.  Monthly
stock price data for the IPO stocks and the stocks of the matching firms are gathered from Account Data
while data for the Danish Total Stock Index (market proxy) are gathered from the Monthly Reports of the
Copenhagen Stock Exchange.
9 First monthly return = 1
/30
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, where Pi,1  is the stock price on the first day of trading, Pi,2  is the
stock price at the end of the subsequent month. and days = number of days left for the first month+30. E.g. is
the first day of trading for Ambu International A/S, March 9, 1992 thus, days = 21+30.
10 We do not include the first-day return in our calculation of the long-term return because it is often difficult
to buy to the offering price. The market price on the first day of trading is usable for a portfolio strategy.
11  A measure like the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is not a relevant measure in the long run as it does
not take the compounding effect of returns into account. E.g. if a deposit account gives a certain periodic
return of 10 percent the CAR method measures a buy-and-hold return of 50 percent after five periods whereas
the true buy-and-hold return is (1.10)5-1 = 61 percent. The CAR method is only a reasonable approximation for
short-horizon returns.
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12  For the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns of the market index 68.3 percent of the sixty cross-sectional
distributions are rejected as being normally distributed on a 5-percent critical level of significance.  The cross-
sectional buy-and-hold returns of the market index are closer to being normally distributed than the other
two: For the IPO stocks 88.3 percent of the sixty cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns are rejected as being
normally distributed and for the stocks of the matching forms the rejection percentage is 98.3.
13 There are 60 months at which the logarithm of the cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns are tested for
normality. For the IPO stocks 16 out of 60 (26.7 percent) months are rejected on a five-percent critical level of
significance. For the Market 34 out of 60 (56.7 percent) are rejected. For the stocks of the matching firms the
logarithmic cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns are accepted as being normal distributed as only 7 out of 60
months (11.7 percent) are rejected, and the rejection is in the first nine months after the initial public offering.
14 Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) use the wealth relatives in another way than we do. They take
the average in the numerator and denominator separately. The way they make their averages has the
weaknesses that this study is about and which we correct for.
15 We do find another transformation that also can be accepted as being lognormal distributed and we denote
it: the transformed buy-and-hold abnormal return (T-BHAR). The transformation is :
Õ
=
-+=- -
T
t
IPO
t
Market
t rrBHART TIPOMarket
1
)1(, .  That is, the difference between the returns is accumulated.
The expression, as expressed here, says that one holds a long position in the market index and a short
position in the IPO stocks. The proceeds are realised each month and reinvested assuming no transaction
costs.
16 We use Doornik and Hansen (1994) test for normality that adjusts for the sample size. The test statistics are
the same whether the T1- or the T2-transformation is applied.
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17 20 percent of data is rejected for the IPO stocks versus the market while only 15 percent of data is rejected
for the IPO stocks versus the stocks of the matching firms.
18 We have investigated whether value weighting has any effect. By value weighting we mean capitalisation
weighting. If an IPO stock A receives an amount of, say, X by the offering while another IPO stock B receives
an amount of, say, 5X by the offering, the weight that we put on IPO stock B will be 5 times as large as the
weight on IPO stock A.  When we did that the distributions degenerated totally. The buy-and-hold returns of
all of the combinations that we investigated were strongly rejected. The Chi-squared statistics were well
above 100. Value weighting did not give us a usable foundation for testing.
19 In a recent paper Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) suggest the use of a skewness-adjusted t statistic. The
statistic uses a third order moment correction like in ordinary and asymptotic normality tests but their method
is quite different from the method that we proposed.
20  The mean component is ca. –0.308 and the volatility component is ca. 0.284 for the IPO/Market-wealth
relative after five years. The level average is –0.104 which is equal to (-0.304+1)*(0.284+1)-1 in accordance
with expression (10).
TABLE 1
The annual distribution and first-day returns of initial public offerings within shipping,
trading, servicing, and industry 1984-1992. First-day returns are average returns within
each year.
Total Sample Sample coverage
 Year
Number
of
IPOs
Amount
Issued
mill.
DKK.
Number
of
IPOs
Amount
Issued
mill.
DKK.
First-
Day
Returns
in
percent
Percent
of
IPOs
Percent
of
amount
issued
1984 27 1158.7 26 1108.7 2.89 96.3 95.7
1985 15 1346.0 14 1324.7 6.76 93.3 98.4
1986 24 1358.1 24 1358.1 4.36 100.0 100.0
1987 4 79.0 3 70.0 1.00 75.0 93.3
1988 3 50.4 2 41.6 0.63 66.7 82.5
1989 3 87.4 2 79.0 3.58 66.7 90.4
1990 2 269.0 1 31.5 1.78 50.0 11.7
1991 3 220.3 2 51.5 2.68 66.7 23.4
1992 2 130.9 2 130.9 1.46 100.0 100.0
Total 83 4699.8 76 4196.0 3.90 91.6 89.3
TABLE 2
The table shows percentage average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns (BHR) and
percentage average cross-sectional cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). All returns
are measured from the first day of trading and up to 5 years after the introduction for
stocks of: the IPO firms, the Danish Total Stock Index (Market), the matching firms,
the differences between IPO firms and the market and matching firms. In {×} are
shown percentage p-values for normality using the Doornik and Hansen (1994) small-
sample test procedure to test for normality. All returns and p-values are in percent.
Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHR)
in percent
      Stocks 0-12 months 0-36 months 0-60 months
IPO firms 12.4{0.00}
12.9
{0.00}
43.2
{0.00}
Market  4.4{0.00}
26.3
{0.00}
69.8
{15.00}
Matching firms
22.0
{0.00}
45.9
{0.00}
55.5
{0.00}
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
in percent
0-12 months 0-36 months 0-60 months
IPO firms 6.3{14.47}
10.3
{0.00}
32.8
{0.00}
Market 4.2{19.23}
26.3
{35.02}
58.7
{4.71}
Matching firms 18.9{0.00}
48.5
{0.00}
64.6
{0.00}
IPO – Market 2.1
{19.26}
-16.1
{0.03}
-25.9
{0.00}
IPO - Matching firms -12.6
{0.00}
-38.3
{0.06}
-31.8
{0.00}
                                                                 TABLE 3
The table shows the percentage average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns in levels of
the different wealth relatives (J). The buy-and-hold returns are calculated from the first
day of trading and until the end of the month shown in the table. The average cross-
sectional buy-and-hold returns, normalized to zero, are given by
1)(
)~~( 2 ,2
1
, -=
×+ TTJTJeJE
sm
. In the table in (×) are shown the cross-sectional standard
deviations in percent of the different wealth relatives:
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s . NN indicates non-normality on a five-percent
critical level of significance of the logarithmic transformations using the Doornik and
Hansen (1994)-test procedure.
Average cross-sectional Buy-and-Hold Returns
in percent
         J 0–12 months    0–36 months 0–60 months
1-IPO
T
Market
T
W
W 10.6
(46.9)
59.9
(112.6)
84.6
(148.8)
1-
IPO
T
Matching
T
W
W 24.6NN
(74.2)
81.3
(182.7)
62.6
(162.3)
1-Market
T
IPO
T
W
W 6.7
(45.2)
-6.5
(65.9)
-10.6
(72.0)
1-Matching
T
IPO
T
W
W 8.7NN
(64.7)
11.3
(112.2)
22.7
(122.5)
TABLE 4
The table shows in percent the decomposition of average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns into
mean components and volatility components for different time horizons T.  The shown value of the
mean component is 1,
~
-
×TTJe
m
 and the value of the volatility components is 1
2
,2
1 ~
-
×TTJe
s
, and in {×}
are given the percentage probabilities (p-values in percent) of the values being equal to zero. (The
decomposition implies that the gross return of the two components have to be multiplied to give
the gross average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns in table 3.)
Buy-and-Hold Returns of the components
in percent
Measure 0 – 12 months 0 - 36 months 0 - 60 months
mean 1.8{35.06}
30.7
{0.03}
43.7
{0.00}
1-IPO
T
Market
T
W
W
volatility 8.8
{0.00}
22.2
{0.00}
28.4
{0.00}
mean -1.8
{35.06}
-23.5
{0.03}
-30.4
{0.00}
Figure 4
1-Market
T
IPO
T
W
W
volatility 8.8{0.00}
22.2
{0.00}
28.4
{0.00}
mean 7.1{14.41}
27.6
{0.71}
15.1
{7.39}
1-
IPO
T
Matching
T
W
W
volatility
16.4
{0.00}
42.0
{0.00}
41.3
{0.00}
mean
-6.6
{14.41}
-21.6
{0.71}
-13.1
{7.39}
Figure 5
1-Matching
T
IPO
T
W
W
volatility
16.4
{0.00}
42.0
{0.00}
41.3
{0.00}
TABEL 5
The table shows percentage cross-sectional averages calculated by the three different methods. For
each of the methods the time horizons (T) are 1 year, 3 years, and 5 years after the first day of
trading. Method 1 is the usual arithmetic cross-sectional averages after T years and in (×) are given
the standard deviations. Method 2 shows the cross-sectional average level values, normalized to
zero, calculated from the hypothesis that the buy-and-hold returns marginally develop according to
a geometric Brownian motions 
( )
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 where },{ Market
T
IPO
T
Market
T
IPO
T
W
W
W
W
J =  and in (×)
are given the relevant standard deviations. In method 3 at a given time horizon T, average cross-
sectional buy-and-hold return is decomposed into a mean component and a volatility component
(the noise). The shown value of the mean component is 1,
~
-
×TTJe
m
 and the value of the volatility
components is 1
2
,2
1 ~
-
×TTJe
s
, and in {×} are given the percentage probabilities (p-values in percent)
of the values being equal to zero. The decomposition implies that the gross return of the two
components have to be multiplied to give the level average gross return of method 2.
Method Measure 0 – 12 months 0 - 36 months 0 - 60 months
IPO firms 12.4
(52.2)
12.9
(72.1)
43.2
(118.5)
method 1 Market 4.4
(18.2)
26.3
(27.8)
69.8
(27.5)
Matching firms
22.0
(63.6)
45.9
(94.6)
55.5
(99.9)
1-Market
T
IPO
T
W
W 6.7
(45.2)
-6.5
(65.9)
-10.6
(72.0)
method 2
1-Matching
T
IPO
T
W
W 8.7
(64.7)
11.3
(112.2)
22.7
(122.5)
mean
-1.8
{35.06}
-23.5
{0.03}
-30.4
{0.00}
1-Market
T
IPO
T
W
W
volatility
8.8
{0.00}
22.2
{0.00}
28.4
{0.00}
mean
-6.6
{14.41}
-21.6
{0.71}
-13.1
{7.39}
method 3
1-Matching
T
IPO
T
W
W
volatility
16.4
{0.00}
42.0
{0.00}
41.3
{0.00}
Figure 1A:  Average cross-sectional buy-and-hold returns
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 60
month
P
er
ce
n
t
IPO firms Market Matching firms
Figure 1B:  Standard deviations of cross-sectional buy-and-hold 
returns
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